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Federalism and the End of Obamacare 
Nicholas Bagley 
abstract.  Federalism has become a watchword in the acrimonious debate over a possible 
replacement for the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Missing from that debate, however, is a theoreti-
cally grounded and empirically informed understanding of how best to allocate power between 
the federal government and the states. For health reform, the conventional arguments in favor of 
a national solution have little resonance: federal intervention will not avoid a race to the bottom, 
prevent externalities, or protect minority groups from state discrimination. Instead, federal ac-
tion is necessary to overcome the states’ fiscal limitations: their inability to deficit-spend and the 
constraints that federal law places on their taxing authority. A more refined understanding of the 
functional justifications for federal action enables a crisp evaluation of the ACA—and of replace-
ments that claim to return authority to the states. 
The election of Donald Trump and an ascendant Republican majority in 
Congress may mean the end of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), better known 
as Obamacare.1 As of this writing, Republican efforts to repeal and replace the 
ACA have become mired in an intraparty fight between hardliners who favor 
outright repeal and moderates concerned about ripping insurance away from 
millions of people. But talks among Republicans continue, and the political sit-
uation remains fluid. Only time will tell. 
As the debate over health reform continues to rage, one question that is 
likely to emerge—indeed, it has already emerged—is why national reform was 
ever thought necessary in the first place. At the core of our federal system is the 
principle that the states should take the lead unless there is a need for national 
 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered section of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Edu-
cation Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). For ease of ref-
erence, and unless otherwise noted, citations will be to the scattered provisions of the U.S. 
Code codifying the ACA. 
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action.2 Federalism is said to foster political participation, to enable experimen-
tation, and, especially, to allow states to tailor their laws to better suit the pref-
erences of their citizens.3 Yet the progressive push for universal health coverage 
has had a doggedly national focus. Even Republican repeal-and-replace pro-
posals stop well short of a total devolution to the states. Why? 
Purely as a strategic matter, the emphasis on federal law needs some de-
fense. By way of comparison, consider same-sex marriage. When Massachu-
setts eliminated its prohibition on same-sex marriage in 2003, advocates did 
not turn immediately to the Supreme Court. They built the groundwork for a 
national strategy by winning in state courts and state ballot boxes. By the time 
the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges,4 thirty-seven states allowed 
same-sex marriage, most through judicial decisions but eleven through refer-
endums or legislation.5 Contrast that to universal health care coverage, where 
the score was a lopsided forty-eight to two, with only the deep-blue states of 
Massachusetts and Hawaii offering near-universal coverage.6 Perhaps the 
states’ collective failure to achieve near-universal coverage indicated the shal-
lowness of public support for health reform. Perhaps the progressive commit-
ment to a national solution was premature. 
This federalism narrative has taken hold among health reform’s opponents. 
It was the cornerstone of the two constitutional challenges in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius: petitioners argued both that the federal 
government lacked the power to adopt an individual mandate and that the 
states were being unconstitutionally coerced into expanding their Medicaid 
programs.7 It underwrites much of the hostility to the “federal takeover” of the 
 
2. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544-45 
(1954) (“National action has . . . always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an in-
trusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case . . . . 
National power may be quite unquestioned in a given situation; those who would advocate 
its exercise must none the less answer the preliminary question why the matter should not 
be le� to the states.”). 
3. See Gregory v. Ashcro�, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
5. See Julia Zorthian, These Are the States Where SCOTUS Just Legalized Same-Sex Marriage, 
TIME (June 26, 2015), http://time.com/3937662/gay-marriage-supreme-court-states-legal 
[http://perma.cc/5LKH-3GBG]; see also State-by-State History of Banning and Legalizing Gay 
Marriage, 1994-2015, PROCON.ORG (Feb. 16, 2016), http://gaymarriage.procon.org
/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 [http://perma.cc/7Y5L-KQSX]. 
6. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Set To Offer Universal Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/us/04cnd-mass.html [http://perma.cc
/2GVB-NKK5]. 
7. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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health-care system. And it lends force to Republican proposals to return power 
over health reform to the states. As Speaker of the House Paul Ryan explains in 
his blueprint for replacing the ACA, the states “should be empowered to make 
the right tradeoffs between consumer protections and individual choice, not 
regulators in Washington. The federal role should be minimal and set a few 
broadly shared goals, while state governments determine how best to imple-
ment those goals in their own markets.”8 
As with so many paeans to federalism, political opportunism explains much 
of this state-centric rhetoric. But there is much to be said for the argument that 
the states should take the lead on health reform. Jerry Mashaw and Ted Mar-
mor argued as much back in 1996, fresh off the defeat of President Clinton’s 
health reform bill. “There is unlikely to be any single system that either is or 
appears ‘best’ for the whole of these United States,” they argued. “Regions, 
states, even localities, differ in their demographic characteristics, political cul-
tures, existing styles of medical practice, and appetites for medical services. 
What is both practical and desirable varies enough to make federalist variation 
both normatively attractive and politically wise as an alternative to national 
stalemate.”9 Why not let the states make the hard calls about whether and how 
they want to tax their residents to finance insurance for those who lack cover-
age by dint of poverty, misfortune, or irresponsibility? 
For those who believe in the functional virtues of devolution, that’s a chal-
lenging question—more challenging than the ACA’s supporters generally ad-
mit. As I explain in Part I, the traditional arguments in favor of a national solu-
tion have little resonance for health reform. Federal action is not needed to 
forestall a race to the bottom; states that decline to expand coverage impose no 
costs on other states; and states are not afflicted with political pathologies that 
might justify national intervention. 
Yet for all that, a national solution was appropriate—even necessary. As dis-
cussed in Part II, two features of the health system make it difficult or impossi-
ble for those states that support universal coverage to achieve it on their own. 
First, the states do not have the same fiscal capacity as the federal government. 
Because they are prohibited by law from deficit spending, they are understand-
ably leery of adopting countercyclical obligations that would force tax increases 
or spending cuts in the middle of the next recession. Second, a federal law—the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—bars states from 
adopting the most expedient laws to expand coverage. Taken together, these 
 
8. Paul Ryan, A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America 12 (2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp-content/uploads/sites/47/2016/06
/ABetterWay-HealthCare-PolicyPaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4QL-NJ9Q]. 
9. Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 
CONN. L. REV. 115, 117 (1995). 
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legal obstacles will frustrate state efforts to achieve near-universal coverage. For 
health reform, the federal government really is the only game in town. 
Part III draws on this more nuanced understanding of the need for national 
health reform to examine critically how such reform ought to allocate responsi-
bilities between the states and the federal government. Roughly, the states 
should retain control over regulation while passing to the federal government 
responsibility for money—the taxes and spending necessary to finance reform. 
In so doing, the argument exploits the distinction, emphasized most powerful-
ly by David Super, between fiscal and regulatory federalism.10 Evaluated against 
that baseline, the ACA is a mixed bag: it properly assumes control over money 
but also wrests more regulatory authority from states than necessary.11 At the 
same time, the leading Republican replacement plans are insufficiently sensi-
tive to the states’ fiscal constraints and to their circumscribed taxing power. 
Unless the plans are revised, we may see the elimination of a federal solution 
combined with the retention of substantial obstacles to state action—or even 
the creation of new obstacles. In that event, the federalism narrative should be 
seen for what it is: constitutional rhetoric that masks a refusal to allow any lev-
el of government to achieve near-universal coverage. 
i .  the traditional justifications 
Federal legislation is o�en considered necessary, first, to avoid a collective-
action problem; second, to prevent states from imposing externalities on other 
states; or third, to correct for a political pathology at the state level. None of 
these justifications is adequate to support national health reform. 
A. Collective-Action Problem 
To the extent that the states cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of col-
lective goods, they will be tempted to contribute little or nothing to the pro-
duction of those goods. They will prefer, instead, to free ride on the contribu-
tions of other states. Since every state has the same incentives, contributions 
toward that collective good will fall short of what the states, acting in concert, 
would prefer. Federal action may be necessary to avoid a race to the bottom. 
 
10. See David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005). 
11. See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-
Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2013) (noting the ACA’s 
“structural schizophrenia” on the allocation of federal and state responsibilities). 
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When it comes to health reform, a race to the bottom might develop if a 
state’s adoption of a coverage expansion led sick people to flock to the state.12 
To avoid becoming a “welfare magnet,” individual states might decline to ex-
pand coverage, even if they would happily expand coverage if they could con-
fine that coverage to their own residents. 
But the welfare magnet story justifies federal intervention only if lots of 
sick people move to get health insurance. The evidence suggests they do not. In 
a 2014 study, Aaron Schwartz and Benjamin Sommers examined migration pat-
terns in response to Medicaid expansions in four states.13 They found “no evi-
dence of significant migration effects” and could “rule out net migration effects 
of larger than 1,600 people a year in an expansion state.”14 A similar 2016 study 
by Lucas Goodman used a broader sample and estimated that “the migration 
effect of Medicaid is very close to zero.”15 These findings, which accord with 
other research on interstate mobility,16 make intuitive sense. People don’t light-
ly move17 and they rarely do so for health reasons.18 Lower-income people in 
particular may not have the resources or the job flexibility to pull up stakes. If 
people don’t move to get insurance, there is no race to the bottom for federal 
action to forestall. 
 
12. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Joshua M. Wiener & Michael Housman, State and Federal Roles in 
Health Care: Rationales for Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY 39 
(John Holahan et al. eds., 2003). 
13. Aaron L. Schwartz & Benjamin D. Sommers, Moving for Medicaid? Recent Eligibility Expan-
sions Did Not Induce Migration from Other States, 33 HEALTH AFF. 88 (2014). 
14. Id. at 88. 
15. Lucas Goodman, The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansion on Migration, 36 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 211, 212 (2016). 
16. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 9, at 121 n.16 (citing research indicating that “public aid 
plays a small role in the migration decisions of poor families”). Evidence on migration in re-
sponse to traditional welfare (e.g., Aid to Families with Dependent Children) is mixed. Even 
those studies that find a migration effect, however, conclude that it is small. See Jan K. 
Brueckner, Welfare Reform and Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence, 66 SOUTHERN ECON. 
J. 505, 519 (2000). 
17. See generally David Schleicher, Stuck in Place: Law and the Economic Consequences of Residen-
tial Stability, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017). 
18. DAVID K. IHRKE, CAROL S. FABER & WILLIAM K. KOERBER, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2008 
TO 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 16 tbl.7 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20 
-565.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4NN-7Q3D] (showing only 2% of people report moving from 
one county to another for health reasons). 
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B. Externalities 
Federal intervention may be warranted where one state’s actions impose 
costs on other states. A state might, for example, locate smokestacks on its 
downwind border in order to send its pollution to a neighbor. A federal re-
sponse may prevent states from passing on the costs of their productive activity 
to other states. 
But externalities cannot justify federal health reform. If New York declines 
to adopt near-universal coverage for its residents, it is hard to see how that im-
poses costs on Connecticut or New Jersey.19 The country can easily accommo-
date a patchwork of state insurance laws. Indeed, it already does. In the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Congress clarified that the states—not the federal 
government—retain primary responsibility for regulating their insurance mar-
kets.20 Over the past seven decades, the states have adopted widely varying 
rules governing health insurance.21 
 
19. In a pinch, it is possible to tell a story about externalities. The uninsured sometimes go 
bankrupt on account of their medical bills. When they do, their creditors absorb the loss and 
serve, in that respect, as insurers of last resort. If most creditors are located out of state, and 
if those creditors cannot protect themselves in advance by charging higher interest rates to 
residents of states without near-universal coverage laws, a state’s refusal to expand coverage 
could allow its residents to impose costs on out-of-state creditors. 
These conditions are unlikely to hold to any significant degree, however. Because most health 
care is locally provided, a bankrupt individual’s medical debt will overwhelmingly be held by 
local hospitals and care providers. That is not the only debt that matters: bankruptcies aris-
ing from medical debt could also harm other non-medical creditors. But mortgage loans 
constitute the largest source of household debt, and they are linked to in-state property, 
which allows banks to price the state-specific risk of default into the loans they issue (as well 
as those they purchase on the secondary market). See N.Y. FED. RESERVE BANK, QUARTERLY 
REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2016), http://www.newyorkfed.org
/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2016Q1.pdf [http://perma.cc
/BG6V-V8RP]. The same will generally hold for auto loan and credit card debt, even if a 
small number of consumers will switch states a�er that debt has been issued. Student loans 
are trickier: a lender cannot know where a student will move once she finishes her studies, 
so it cannot price the risk of default arising from unpaid medical bills into her loan. But stu-
dent loans are almost impossible to discharge in bankruptcy, mitigating the risk considera-
bly. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
21. STATE INSURANCE REGULATION, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (2011) (reviewing a brief history 
of state insurance regulation). 
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C. Political Pathologies 
Federal authority is sometimes justified as an effort to correct for political 
pathologies at the state level. The Voting Rights Act and other laws adopted 
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments, for example, reflect the fear that 
elected officials and voters in many states, especially in the South, will be sys-
tematically inattentive to the interests of minority groups.22 Perhaps federal 
control can assure that discrimination does not deprive those groups of a fair 
shot to make their voices heard. 
It is perhaps possible to build a similar case for health reform. In 2013, only 
13% of the non-elderly white population in the United States lacked health cov-
erage, compared to 21% of the black population and 32% of the Hispanic popu-
lation.23 Although the ACA afforded the states an opportunity to alleviate those 
disparities by expanding their Medicaid programs, nineteen states have refused 
to expand. In conventional economic terms, this resistance is inexplicable: the 
federal government will pay 100% of the costs of expansion in the early years, 
dropping to 90% by 2020.24 States are passing up billions of dollars in federal 
money financed, in part, by taxes on the states’ own residents. What’s more, 
Medicaid expansion boosts employment in the health sector, enables states to 
reduce spending on mental health services, and raises tax revenue by redirect-




22. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2010) (noting the recurring “worry that local power is a 
threat to minority rights”). 
23. HEALTH COVERAGE BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 5 fig.6 (2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2014/07/8423-health-coverage-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf [http://perma.cc
/JHC8-8Y94]. 
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)(A)-(E). 
25. John Z. Ayanian et al., Economic Effects of Medicaid Expansion in Michigan, 376 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 407, 408 (2017). 
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Figure 1. 
What explains, then, the resistance to Medicaid expansion? Although op-
position may speak to the states’ principled objections to health reform, it is 
difficult to ignore that the states with the darkest history of racial discrimina-
tion have resisted most staunchly. As Mark Hall has argued: 
This degree of pitched opposition by states to a major federal domestic 
initiative has not been seen since the civil rights era of the 1960s. Then, 
too, states opposed federal intervention (for integration) based on 
states’ rights principles. But, the true motives were patent. It is certainly 
possible that similar motives are among the mix of sentiments shared 
by at least some opponents of Medicaid expansion . . . . [Coverage] 
disparities suggest that politicians who oppose Medicaid expansion will 
do more damage to their black than their white constituencies.26 
If racism has tainted states’ decisions pertaining to the post-ACA Medicaid ex-
pansion, that same racism might likewise have impeded the adoption of near-
universal coverage at the state level. If so, the Medicaid example might be taken 
to offer evidence of the need to nationalize health reform—to take the decision 
out of the hands of states that cannot be trusted to make it fairly. 
But the case is harder to sustain than it may at first appear. State decisions 
about health reform may be inflected by insensitivity to minorities’ interest, but 
the same can be said in many other policy domains. Take education, for exam-
 
26. Mark A. Hall, States’ Decisions Not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1459, 1464-65 (2014) 
(citations omitted). 
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ple. Many states can (and do) rely on property taxes to finance local schools. 
Wealthier communities get well-funded schools; poor and minority communi-
ties do not. Appalling as that may be, it is generally not thought sufficient to 
warrant a federal takeover of public schools.27 If it were, lingering discrimina-
tion would be reason enough to oust the states of their authority to tax and 
spend, spelling the end of federalism in any meaningful sense of the word. 
That kind of all-purpose justification is in serious tension with a constitutional 
system that remains committed to federalism, however imperfectly. 
The moral case for guaranteeing universal access to care makes it easy, rhe-
torically, to characterize health insurance as a right—one so embedded in 
shared national values that the federal government ought to protect it.28 Rea-
sonable people, however, hold divergent views about the strength of that moral 
case. And it’s hard to explain why, in a nation committed to federalism, the 
moral views of voters in one state should carry the day in another state that 
doesn’t see the problem the same way. Insisting that a federal law advances na-
tional values may be code for saying that some states have bad values. 
For an analogy, imagine the federal government were to ban smoking in 
restaurants and bars, as many municipalities have done. Such a ban would be a 
boon for public health, perhaps more so than health reform itself. It would ad-
dress fears that states were callous about the health of minorities and the poor, 
who smoke at relatively high rates. And a ban could be defended on the ground 
that it’s consistent with national values or that everyone has a right to a smoke-
free environment. For all that, however, the case for federal action is weak: it 
depends, at bottom, on the view that the states without smoking bans have not 
properly weighed the public health benefits against the distastefulness of state 
control. The right to health insurance is closer to the right to a smoke-free 
workplace than it may at first appear—at least until money comes into play. 
i i .  better justifications 
For health reform, the weakness of the conventional justifications for feder-
al intervention presents a puzzle. Why were supporters of health reform so 
committed to a national solution? Why did the possibility of leaving reform to 
the states seem hardly to arise? 
 
27. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a constitu-
tional challenge to Texas’s system of financing public education). 
28. But see Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 PENN. L. REV. 2209, 2216 (2011) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has never indicated that the national or state governments are re-
quired to provide Americans with access to health care.”). 
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There is, in fact, one very good reason for pursuing national health reform: 
money. State governments have neither the fiscal capacity nor the freedom to 
tax that the federal government does. That puts states in a bind: they cannot 
act even if they would prefer to adopt universal coverage and even if they are 
willing to tax their residents in order to do so. As the dismal history of state-
level reform suggests, the states can’t go it alone.29 
A. The Countercyclical Trap 
In their attacks on the ACA, Republicans take aim at the federal regulations 
that, in their view, stymie the market, inflate the costs of health insurance, and 
limit consumer choice. But framing the ACA as a regulatory incursion obscures 
that it is not only—not even primarily—a regulatory statute. True, it creates a 
comprehensive suite of new rules for the (relatively small) individual insurance 
market. It also imposes some new rules (not many) on employer-sponsored 
plans. But what the ACA chiefly does is distribute tax revenue to the poor and 
near-poor to finance insurance coverage. The distribution comes in two main 
forms: first, through the Medicaid expansion, which benefits those below or 
near the poverty level; and second, through the subsidies available to those 
buying coverage in the individual market who make less than four times the 
poverty level. The regulations imposed on the individual market were thought 
necessary to assure the health of that market and to protect consumers, but 
they were in an important sense incidental. While the ACA does do a fair 
amount of regulating, it is mainly a spending program—and a large one at that. 
The ACA is also a countercyclical spending program.30 When a recession 
hits, many people will lose both their jobs and their employer-sponsored cov-
erage. The ranks of those eligible for Medicaid and for ACA subsidies will pre-
dictably grow, leading to larger federal outlays. At the same time, the economic 
downturn will depress tax revenues. The federal government can deficit-spend 
to manage these countercyclical fluctuations. The states, however, cannot. 
With the exception of Vermont, the states are legally obliged to balance their 
 
29. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 41 (2011) (discussing failed 
reform efforts in Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and 
Washington). The most prominent failure came in 2007, when then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger of California joined with Democrats in the state legislature to advance an 
ambitious reform bill, only to watch it crumble. See Marian R. Mulkey & Mark D. Smith, 
The Long and Winding Road: Reflections On California’s ‘Year Of Health Reform,’ 28 HEALTH 
AFF. w446 (2009). 
30. For the definitive work on the distinction between regulatory and fiscal federalism, and on 
the countercyclical challenges to the latter, see Super, supra note 10. 
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budgets every year.31 And states are understandably reluctant to adopt large 
obligations that will require savage spending cuts or he�y tax increases when 
times get tough. Cuts and taxes are not only unpopular, but they would also 
depress the economy further, exacerbating the recession. Broad coverage ex-
pansions thus commit states to an economic policy that could inflict serious 
damage on their residents.32 
As the exception that proves the rule, Massachusetts is instructive. When it 
adopted statewide reform, Massachusetts had two advantages that no other 
state had. First, it had the lowest rate of uninsured in the country, meaning that 
its countercyclical obligations would be more modest than those of other 
states.33 Second, with the help of Senator Ted Kennedy, the state got a sweet-
heart deal from the George W. Bush Administration offering it more than $1 
billion in Medicaid funding to support a coverage expansion.34 Massachusetts 
could afford to bite the bullet. States without those advantages cannot—at least 
without help from the federal government. 
B. Federal Limits on State Tax Authority 
A state that wishes to expand coverage can always ask its taxpayers to foot 
the bill. But many of those taxpayers will complain, with some justice, that it’s 
unfair to ask them to bear the whole burden. A resident who gets health cover-
age through her job—let’s call her Anna—already faces a reduction in take-
home pay commensurate with the value of that coverage. Another resident who 
works at a similar job but does not get health coverage—let’s call him Bob—
likely receives higher cash wages. Should Anna and Bob both face the same 
new tax, even if it finances a coverage expansion that will only benefit Bob? 
From the state’s perspective, it is both easier and more equitable to adopt a 
law penalizing businesses that fail to offer insurance. These pay-or-play laws 
have a clear political logic: employers should live up to their end of the social 
bargain. They have a certain economic logic, too: if Bob starts getting coverage 
because of a pay-or-play law, he will see an offsetting wage reduction. Bob will 
thus “pay” for his own coverage, reducing the need for a tax increase that 
would also hit Anna. 
 
31. Id. at 2609 n.251. 
32. See Mulkey & Smith, supra note 29, at w454 (arguing that the “[b]oom-and-bust cycles” of 
state finances has contributed to the collapse of “virtually every major state expansion of 
health coverage across the country in the past two decades”). 
33. See MCDONOUGH, supra note 29, at 37-43. 
34. See id. at 39. 
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The trouble is that ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to any employee 
benefit plan,” including a plan offering health coverage.35 Although there is 
some legal uncertainty—more on that in a moment—preemption probably 
means that states cannot impose a penalty on employers that refuse to offer 
health coverage.36 By taking pay-or-play laws off the table, ERISA makes it 
much harder for states to achieve near-universal coverage.37 And because of the 
intensity of the business lobby’s resistance to limiting ERISA’s preemptive 
scope,38 Congress is very unlikely to amend the law to address the concern. 
Why might a pay-or-play law “relate to” employee-benefit plans within the 
meaning of ERISA? In Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder,39 the Fourth Cir-
cuit examined a Maryland law requiring companies with more than 10,000 
employees in the state to devote at least 8% of their payroll toward health cov-
erage or pay the equivalent as a tax. By design, the law applied only to Wal-
Mart, which had come under fire for shunting its employees onto Medicaid.40 
Any taxes that Maryland collected would be deposited in a specified health 
fund to support health coverage for Maryland residents. 
The Fourth Circuit started with first principles. Under ERISA, Maryland 
could not direct Wal-Mart to offer health insurance. That sort of law would 
“relate to” the design of an employee-benefit plan within the meaning of 
ERISA.41 By extension, the court reasoned, Maryland could not achieve the 
same result by taxing a company’s failure to offer health coverage. The court 
brushed aside Maryland’s objection that the statute le� the employer with a 
choice about how to structure its employees’ benefits: 
Healthcare benefits are a part of the total package of employee compen-
sation an employer gives in consideration for an employee’s services. An 
 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
36. For a sampling of the literature on the question, see Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA 
Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88 (2009); 
Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential Lessons from Massachu-
setts, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1203 (2007); Christen Linke Young, Note, Pay or Play Programs and 
ERISA Section 514: Proposals for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & 
ETHICS 197 (2010). 
37. See Mulkey & Smith, supra note 29, at w453 (“Navigating [ERISA] law, which prevents 
states from regulating employee benefits, is a well-known challenge in designing state cov-
erage expansion proposals . . . that preserve a central role for employer coverage.”). 
38. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
39. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
40. See Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/13/business/maryland-sets-a-health-cost-for-walmart
.html [http://perma.cc/T7SL-R879]. 
41. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 192 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). 
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employer would gain from increasing the compensation it offers em-
ployees through improved retention and performance of present em-
ployees and the ability to attract more and better new employees. In 
contrast, an employer would gain nothing in consideration of paying a 
greater sum of money to the State. Indeed, it might suffer from lower 
employee morale and increased public condemnation. In effect, the only 
rational choice employers have . . . is to structure their ERISA 
healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending thresh-
old.42 
The Fielder court’s reasoning is not unassailable. Rick Hills, for one, has written 
persuasively about why an expansive view of ERISA preemption should be re-
jected.43 Even with the utmost sensitivity to state interests, however, the core of 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision appears sound. If ERISA prevents a state from 
demanding that employers provide health insurance to their employees—and it 
does, at least under current case law—it should likewise prevent a state from 
imposing a substantial penalty on employers that choose not to. 
The Ninth Circuit seemed to acknowledge as much in Golden Gate Restau-
rant Association v. City and County of San Francisco,44 even as it distinguished 
Fielder in a somewhat strained effort to uphold a municipal pay-or-play ordi-
nance. For the Ninth Circuit, distinctive features of the San Francisco ordi-
nance le� employers with “a meaningful alternative” to restructuring their em-
ployee-benefit plans.45 In particular, any tax penalty paid under the San 
Francisco ordinance would go toward a public program dedicated to residents 
whose employers did not offer health coverage. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, that 
gave employers a real choice: they could offer coverage directly (as a fringe 
benefit of employment) or indirectly (via an earmarked tax).46 An employer 
that chose the latter approach would have to make no changes at all to its em-
ployee benefit plan. As such, the court reasoned, ERISA did not preempt the 
ordinance.47 
 
42. Id. at 193. 
43. See Rick Hills, Local Democracy’s Struggle with ERISA Preemption, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 26, 
2008, 10:29 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/12/city-power-to 
-impose-healthcare-mandates-on-employers-erisa.html [http://perma.cc/PQ3U-QVGH]; 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the Federal Legislative 
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
44. 546 F.3d 639, 655 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that ERISA would preempt a state law that “re-
quire[d] any employer to adopt [a] health plan” for its employees). 
45. Id. at 660. 
46. Id. at 655-56. 
47. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision was controversial.48 Unsurprisingly, the ensu-
ing petition for certiorari argued that the court had opened a split with the 
Fourth Circuit. By the time the Supreme Court called for the views of the Solic-
itor General, however, President Obama had taken office—and by the time the 
brief was submitted, the ACA had been enacted.49 Because the ACA “signifi-
cantly reduces the potential that state or local governments will choose to enact 
health care programs” like the San Francisco ordinance, the Solicitor General 
recommended that the Court decline to hear the case.50 The Court obliged,51 
leaving the tension between the Ninth and Fourth Circuit decisions unresolved. 
For all practical purposes, the resulting state of affairs gives the states little 
room to maneuver. The apparent circuit split notwithstanding, ERISA almost 
certainly preempts pay-or-play laws that impose substantial taxes on employ-
ers, at least where those taxes are not earmarked for use of particular employ-
ees. States could minimize the risk of preemption by limiting the size of the tax 
penalty; as Amy Monahan has argued, a small penalty arguably leaves employ-
ers with a real choice about whether to offer coverage.52 That was Massachu-
setts’s approach: it levied a small pay-or-play tax of $295 per employee.53 But a 
small tax does little to encourage employers to offer insurance or to finance a 
coverage expansion—and even a small tax might still be subject to preemption. 
Alternatively, states could undertake the cumbersome, complex task of creating 
public health plans for employee use. Per Golden Gate, pay-or-play laws that 
earmark employer contributions might avoid ERISA preemption. 
But they probably wouldn’t. Even if the presumption against preemption 
has purchase in other corners of the law, it does not appear to move the Su-
preme Court in ERISA cases.54 Without the motivating force of that interpre-
tive presumption, it is difficult—not impossible, but difficult—to defend the 
Ninth Circuit’s heroic effort to save the San Francisco ordinance from preemp-
tion. Perhaps more to the point, the vote line-ups in Fielder and Golden Gate 
suggest that judges are split over the scope of ERISA preemption along pre-
dictable political lines. Conservative judges, with their sensitivity to business 
 
48. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (eight judges dissenting from the refusal to rehear the case). 
49. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 130 S. Ct. 3497 (U.S. 2010) (No. 08-1515), 2010 WL 2173776. 
50. Id. at 8. 
51. Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 130 S. Ct. 3497 (2010) (deny-
ing certiorari). 
52. See Monahan, supra note 36, at 1214. 
53. Id. 
54. See Jacobson, supra note 36 (describing the Supreme Court’s tendency to favor broad ERISA 
preemption). 
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interests, tend to take an expansive view of ERISA preemption, even as liberal 
judges resist construing ERISA to curtail states’ regulatory authority. With 
President Trump’s victory and Judge Gorsuch’s confirmation, the Supreme 
Court probably will not be receptive to creative efforts to avoid ERISA preemp-
tion.55 At a minimum, the unsettled scope of ERISA preemption will give 
states pause. Why take the political hit for imposing a new “employer man-
date” when the courts will probably invalidate it anyhow?56 
Here, Hawaii is the exception that proves the rule. The central feature of 
Hawaii’s success in achieving universal coverage is a stringent pay-or-play 
law.57 That law, which predated ERISA, remains on the books only because 
Hawaii persuaded Congress to grant it an explicit carve-out from ERISA 
preemption.58 Lacking a similar carve-out, the other states will have an exquis-
itely hard time moving forward with reform. To put it bluntly: anyone who 
says the states can expand coverage on their own doesn’t understand ERISA. 
 
* * * 
 
National health reform does not resolve a collective-action problem; it mit-
igates no externalities; and it is not an answer to state-level political patholo-
gies. It is nonetheless readily justified as a response to the states’ limited fiscal 
powers and ERISA’s sweeping displacement of state law. Taken together, these 
obstacles will impair the states’ ability to enact and sustain efforts to cover the 
uninsured. 
i i i . implications for reform 
A more refined understanding of the functional justifications for federal ac-
tion yields insight into how to allocate responsibility over health reform. It also 
enables a crisp evaluation of the ACA and the merits of reform proposals that 
purport to return authority to the states. 
 
55. Cf. Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335, 1340-43 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.) 
(adopting a broad construction of an express preemption statute). 
56. Mulkey & Smith, supra note 29, at 453 (observing that ERISA “virtually oblig[es] state poli-
cymakers to take a major risk when they design coverage-expansion plans”). 
57. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-11, 393-33. 
58. 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(5) (2012). 
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A. The Affordable Care Act 
The discussion of collective-action problems, externalities, and political pa-
thologies suggests the difficulty of justifying federal control over the regulation 
of insurance. At the same time, the federal government’s superior fiscal powers 
must be enlisted to make coverage expansions possible. That implies a rough 
allocation of responsibility. The federal government should finance the bulk of 
any coverage expansion that commands support in Congress, but the states 
should retain substantial authority to structure their health-care markets as 
they see fit. 
As always, there are federalism costs to making a collective decision about 
taxes and spending. Nebraskans, for example, may bridle at federal tax hikes 
that are used to finance a coverage expansion that they wouldn’t choose for 
themselves. But the alternative is worse: because of the countercyclical trap and 
ERISA preemption, all the states are disabled from acting alone, even if most 
would prefer to bear the costs that addressing the crisis of the uninsured would 
entail. Financing coverage at the federal level will not suit all the states, but it 
will suit more Americans than no solution at all. 
In many respects, the ACA embraces this allocation of federal-state respon-
sibility. The Medicaid expansion, for example, is financed almost entirely by 
the federal government, but states retain operational control over the pro-
gram.59 The Obama Administration’s willingness to grant broad Medicaid 
waivers has allowed the states to adopt policies that align with their interests. 
Similarly, subsidies for individual plans purchased through the health-care ex-
changes come out of federal funds, even as states were given the option of run-
ning the exchanges themselves.60 Most dramatically, the ACA authorizes states 
to seek waivers from most of the statute’s regulatory restrictions if the state can 
show how it will use federal money—both Medicaid and subsidy dollars—to 
achieve the same level of coverage. If a waiver is granted, that money passes 
through to the state directly.61 
In other respects, however, the ACA takes a heavier hand. All insurers are 
prohibited, for example, from refusing to cover someone with a preexisting 
condition.62 They must write insurance for all comers.63 They must charge the 
same rate to everyone, with limited exceptions for differential pricing based on 
 
59. 42 U.S.C § 1396(a) (2012). 
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012). 
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012). 
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012). 
federalism and the end of obamacare 
17 
age and smoking habits.64 And they must cover a comprehensive roster of ben-
efits and cap their customers’ out-of-pocket spending.65 These are all perfectly 
reasonable policies, but they are not policies that the states uniformly endorse. 
And while states that wish to opt out of the insurance regulations can seek a 
waiver, the conditions on receipt of the waiver are stringent: the state plan 
must cover at least the same number of people with insurance that is at least as 
comprehensive and affordable as the insurance available under the ACA.66 Un-
surprisingly, only one Obamacare waiver has been granted so far. It went to 
Hawaii, and it was modest in scope.67 No waiver has been issued to red states 
that want to depart more dramatically from the ACA’s rules. 
The states thus have some reason to complain (though less than they some-
times assert) that the federal government has inhibited their lawmaking pow-
ers without adequate justification. Take the prohibition on charging older peo-
ple more than three times what younger people pay for coverage.68 In its 
absence, the young would pay less for their coverage and the old would pay 
more. Maybe that’s sensible, maybe it’s not: it depends on a value judgment 
about how to fairly allocate health-care costs across a population. Why not 
leave that judgment to the states? 
To push the point harder, consider the ban on medical underwriting. The 
ACA reflects the judgment that it is unfair to deny coverage to the sick or to ask 
them to pay more for their coverage. The ACA thus embraces policies—in par-
ticular, the much-maligned individual mandate—that its dra�ers thought nec-
essary to cope with the risk that people will wait until they got sick to purchase 
coverage. For the ACA’s supporters, the individual mandate is a reasonable 
price to pay to prevent discrimination against the sick. But many people don’t 
see it the same way. Some reject the claim that the government should be in the 
business of guaranteeing coverage for everyone.69 Others don’t think that med-
 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). By regulation, HHS asked the states to designate a “bench-
mark plan” from a list of plans in which their residents are already enrolled. Whatever bene-
fits are covered by the benchmark plans would then be considered essential. See Nicholas 
Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act, 39 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 441 (2014). 
66. See 42 U.S.C. 18052(b) (2012). 




68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
69. See Philip Klein, GOP Will Fail on Obamacare If They Can’t Admit a Simple Truth, WASH. EX-
AMINER (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/gop-will-fail-on-obamacare 
-if-they-cant-admit-a-simple-truth/article/2611075 [http://perma.cc/2HZA-ATTD]. 
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ical underwriting, however distasteful, warrants a heavy-handed purchase ob-
ligation.70 And still others doubt that the mandate is strictly necessary to pre-
vent adverse selection.71 If those who disagree with the ACA’s approach com-
mand the levers of political power within a state, why shouldn’t those states be 
allowed to try something different? 
The argument can be generalized to most of the ACA’s insurance reforms. 
And I can already hear the response from adherents of a national solution: Be-
cause this “something different” will not work. The ACA’s opponents are completely 
unrealistic about the tough tradeoffs that health-care policymaking entails. Millions of 
people could lose coverage. 
That might be right; indeed, I suspect it is right. But that is my judgment. 
Lots of smart people do not share that judgment. And if federalism means any-
thing, it is that national judgment should not supersede state judgment, absent 
a good reason for federal intervention. Yes, federal money might be squandered 
in a state that adopts stupid insurance rules. People could go bankrupt and 
even die as a result of the lack of coverage. But that’s an issue between the state 
and its voters. If other states use the money more effectively, the state with the 
stupid rules will come under pressure to improve them. And what if it turns 
out that what seemed stupid is not so stupid a�er all?72 
Democracy rests on the conceit that we all have an equal voice in determin-
ing what the good is, which is why Michigan voters don’t get to tell Ohioans 
how to spend their tax dollars, even if Wolverines know in their hearts that 
they make better decisions than Buckeyes. And while the federal government 
can make decisions for Ohio, it should not do so just because it doubts the wis-
dom, intelligence, or values of Ohio residents. “The states have bad ideas” is a 
poor justification for federal law (unless, again, those bad ideas turn on views 
about the inferiority of minority groups). Federalism thrives when we recog-
nize the limits of what we know, appreciate that good people can hold views 
that many others find repugnant, and acknowledge that our own misconcep-
tions and prejudices can blind us. Sometimes federalism means letting the 
states wave their crazy flags. 
At the same time, however, Congress can and should place conditions on 
the money it disburses to states. The possibility that a state might abuse unre-
stricted funds could make it difficult to enact and sustain federal legislation—
 
70. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
71. See Paul Starr, The Mandate Miscalculation, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://newrepublic.com/article/98554/individual-mandate-affordable-care-act. 
[http://perma.cc/3VE7-E5HK]. 
72. Cf. Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 9, at 121 (“The ‘problem’ of ‘inadequate’ state health 
plans is, in many respects, not a problem at all . . . There is no agreed-upon ‘best’ health 
insurance (or medical care) system that a state could offer.”). 
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which would be especially unfortunate in a domain like health reform, where 
the states are disabled from acting on their own. If Congress imposes new taxes 
to finance a coverage expansion, only to watch Iowa use that money to subsi-
dize corn farmers, Iowa’s actions could imperil a policy of health reform that, 
collectively, the American public supports. Policymakers are justified in taking 
that political risk into account and creating broad conditions on the use of 
funds. 
More than that: Congress can establish guardrails to prevent states from 
subverting the purposes of federal action, only to then use the failure of the 
federal initiative as an excuse to lobby for its dismantlement.73 Mashaw and 
Marmor propose, for example, requiring states to use federal money to achieve 
universal, comprehensive, portable health coverage while establishing a plan 
for accountability and fiscal viability.74 In other words, states should be obliged 
to use federal money to create an entitlement to health insurance—no lotteries 
or queuing permitted—but the entitlement should be articulated at a high level 
of generality and implemented in a manner that gives the states room to adopt 
their own distinctive approaches.75 The states would thus exercise authority—
what Abbe Gluck aptly calls “federal-law-granted” powers—within a broad 
domain demarcated by Congress.76 
 
73. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 716-18 & 
n.308 (2004) (discussing the use of this two-step strategy to attack entitlement programs 
during and a�er the Reagan revolution). 
74. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 9, at 118. 
75. David Super has argued that programs based on unrestricted grants—money with few or no 
strings—have proven fragile because “federal policymakers . . . must bear the political 
costs of raising the revenue and forgo the political rewards of spending that revenue on pro-
grams for which they would receive political credit.” Super, supra note 10, at 2557-58 n.54; see 
also Super, supra note 73, at 710-11. Super’s point is well-taken, but adding strings to federal 
money can create its own form of fragility: states may bridle so much at the restrictions that 
they agitate for radically altering or undoing the program altogether. In the politically con-
tentious environment of health reform, relaxing federal control may enhance sustainability, 
even if federal policymakers can claim somewhat less credit for reform than they might have 
if they had imposed more restrictions on federal funds. 
76. See Gluck, supra note 11, at 1751; see also Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1996, 1997 (2014) (“With almost every national statutory step, Congress gives states 
new governing opportunities or incorporates aspects of state law—displacing state authority 
with one hand and giving it back with the other.”). 
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B. Replacing Obamacare 
Although it has so far failed to do so, the new Congress still hopes to repeal 
the ACA and replace it with a law that will return power to the states.77 If Con-
gress wishes to give the states genuine flexibility, however, its adoption of an 
Obamacare replacement must be sensitive to the features of the health-care sys-
tem that have frustrated state action in the past. 
1. Regulation 
For health reform, the most challenging federalism questions arise with re-
spect to Medicaid and the private insurance market, where the lines of federal 
and state power are blurry, shi�ing, and contested. It is those aspects of the 
ACA that are the focus of the new Congress’s repeal-and-replace strategy—and 
the ones that can be usefully evaluated in light of Speaker Ryan’s professed aim 
to “empower[]” the states.78 
Although replacement proposals are still on the drawing board, broad 
commitments have been sketched out.79 Some of those commitments advance 
federalism values. Republican legislators object, for example, to portions of the 
ACA requiring insurers to cover “essential health benefits.” They would prefer 
to allow insurers to cover a narrower roster of benefits, which would in turn 
enable consumers to shop for insurance that is tailored to their needs and pock-
etbooks. There are reasonable policy objections to the approach: that expansive 
plans will attract sicker customers, fueling adverse selection and driving up 
premiums for everyone; that insurance is such a complex financial product that 
consumers shouldn’t have to worry that their plans exclude services they might 
one day need; and that the coverage requirements are not that onerous anyhow. 
But these are also the sorts of policy objections that the states can reasonably 
disagree about. 
The same holds true for most of the ACA’s insurance reforms, including the 
obligation to cover preventive services, age bands, and the ban on medical un-
 
77. See Yuval Levin, The Waivers Question, NAT’L REVIEW (Apr. 5, 2017, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/446453/gop-health-debate-continues-yuval-levin 
[http://perma.cc/ZC6C-MTB7]. 
78. Ryan, supra note 8, at 12. 
79. In particular, the American Health Care Act (AHCA) offers the most detailed insight into 
Republican priorities. See 115TH CONG., BUDGET RECONCILIATION LEGISLATIVE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS RELATING TO REPEAL AND REPLACE OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT (Comm. Print 2017), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans
.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/AmericanHealthCareAct.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3QC9-MKY3]. 
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derwriting. It even applies to the individual mandate. Recognizing that stable 
insurance markets require a balanced risk pool, Republican legislators have 
been exploring alternatives. One approach, reflected in the House leadership’s 
preferred replacement bill, the American Health Care Act (AHCA),80 would 
allow medical underwriting only for those people who do not maintain “con-
tinuous coverage.” The hope is to encourage healthy people to come into the 
insurance market before they get sick.81 Another alternative would automati-
cally enroll people in an insurance plan, but leave them free to opt out if they 
choose to do so.82 Through sheer inertia, healthy people who might not have 
taken the trouble to enroll might stay insured. It is not clear whether either of 
these proposals would be adequate to foster healthy insurance markets (or 
whether auto-enrollment is technically feasible). But that is the point: it is not 
clear. And even if the individual mandate works better than these alternatives, 
many people might reasonably prefer a less-effective alternative that doesn’t in-
volve a heavy-handed government mandate. Again, given the diversity of opin-
ion, decentralization seems appropriate. 
Were it inclined to do so, Congress could adopt a baseline—perhaps the 
current ACA—while at the same time leaving the states free to adopt alterna-
tives that met loose congressional benchmarks. That way, if Connecticut want-
ed to stick with the ACA’s regulatory approach, Connecticut could do so.83 Ar-
kansas, in contrast, could experiment with (say) a continuous coverage 
provision and high-risk pools. An approach that deferred to state choice in this 
manner would usefully restore power to the states. 
At the same time, however, some Republican proposals would impair state 
authority. Most significantly, President Trump ran for office on a vow to allow 
the cross-border sale of health insurance.84 Proposals to that effect are in most 
Republican plans.85 If adopted, they would allow the residents of one state to 
purchase health insurance that is licensed and regulated in another state. 
 
80. AHCA, § 133. 
81. Id. 
82. See Caitlin Owens, Why Trumpcare Might Sign You Up For Health Insurance Without Asking, 
AXIOS (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.axios.com/why-trumpcare-might-sign-you-up-for 
-health-insurance-without-asking-2162181493.html [http://perma.cc/3D93-VCEP]. 
83. See Nicholas Bagley, Patching Obamacare at the State Level, INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 
2016, 7:41 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/patching-obamacare-at-the-state-level 
[http://perma.cc/SU7D-6R9V]. 
84. See Michael Ollove, Interstate Health Insurance: Sounds Good, But Details Are Tricky, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research 
-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/18/interstate-health-insurance-sounds-good-but 
-details-are-tricky [http://perma.cc/XV57-7R2Q]. 
85. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 16. 
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To enable cross-border sales, Congress would have to strip the states of 
their authority, confirmed under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, to regulate in-
surance sold within their borders.86 States would be le� with the residual pow-
er to oversee those insurers that are domiciled within the state. Given the ease 
of changing corporate domicile, insurers may move their headquarters to juris-
dictions that with permissive insurance regulations. The same dynamic has al-
ready played out with credit card regulation, which is why your credit card bills 
come from South Dakota. Far from avoiding a race to the bottom, federal law 
would create one. 
As a result, a state with permissive health insurance regulations—maybe 
North Dakota this time—could effectively establish insurance rules that govern 
in every other state. Voters in California and New York would have no say in 
the matter, even if they preferred consumer protections that North Dakota had 
abandoned. That’s why allowing sales across state lines is even worse for feder-
alism than a needlessly intrusive federal statute. When Congress preempts state 
law, at least voters in California and New York have a say in the matter. They 
have no say over North Dakota’s insurance rules. 
As it stands, the states already have the authority to permit cross-border 
sales; indeed, six states have done so.87 And the ACA explicitly authorizes 
states to band together in “interstate compacts” to enable sales across state 
lines.88 But it’s one thing for a state to choose to allow its residents to purchase 
insurance that another state regulates. If Oklahoma has no objection to plans 
sold by North Dakota insurers, Oklahoma can agree to allow North Dakota 
plans to be sold in its state. It is another thing altogether to prohibit states from 
making that choice, as Republican proposals would entail. This is not a strate-
gy to empower the states. It is a strategy to deregulate the insurance market, 
even in those states that would prefer tighter regulation. 
2. Money 
Simply wiping the ACA from the books would not enable the states to tack-
le health reform. Because of the countercyclical trap and ERISA preemption, 
facilitating a state-centric approach will require Congress to adopt a replace-
ment under which Congress continues to pay for health reform. 
 
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
87. See Sabrina Corlette et al., Selling Health Insurance Across State Lines: An Assessment of State 
Laws and Implications for Improving Choice and Affordability of Coverage, CTR. ON HEALTH INS. 
REFORMS 6 (Oct. 2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012
/rwjf401409 [http://perma.cc/3LVJ-ZV2N]. 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 18053 (2012). 
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Three aspects of Republican proposals—including the AHCA—present 
cause for concern. First, Congress’s top priority appears to be the adoption of a 
reconciliation bill that zeroes out the ACA’s taxes.89 The resulting tax break 
would be enormous: the Congressional Budget Office estimates it will result in 
a loss to the federal budget of $629.3 billion over ten years.90 Republicans an-
ticipate filling the resulting budget hole by cutting federal spending—including 
the spending upon which health reform depends. 
Second, leading Republican proposals would end the ACA’s rules guaran-
teeing the affordability of insurance coverage. Under current law, no one mak-
ing less than four times the poverty level has to devote more than 9.69% of her 
income toward a typical plan on the ACA’s exchanges (and most pay much 
less).91 Premium subsidies thus rise and fall with the price of coverage: the 
cheaper the insurance, the lower the subsidies, and vice versa. Most Republican 
proposals, however, would key the subsidy to a fixed amount and distribute it 
based on age, not income.92 Especially for low-income people, those fixed 
amounts are generally inadequate to adequately defray the cost of coverage, 
leading to a sharp spike in the rate of the uninsured.93 Worse still, the AHCA 
does not even index the subsidies to inflation, much less medical inflation, 
which would lead their value relative to the price of coverage to diminish over 
time. As coverage becomes more unaffordable, states that wish to maintain 
universal coverage will have to raise taxes to make up the difference—a difficult 
trick in light of the countercyclical trap and ERISA preemption. 
Third, congressional Republicans hope to transform Medicaid from an in-
dividual entitlement to a block grant—a fixed sum of money that places few re-
strictions on the purposes that states can use it for.94 In some respects, block 
grant proposals promote federalism: they afford states more discretion about 
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how to put Medicaid dollars to work.95 A state, for example, could place limits 
on eligibility or benefits; more creatively, it could use some of its Medicaid 
money for lead abatement in urban cores, as Michigan has recently been al-
lowed to do on a small scale.96 But the devil is in the details. A fixed block grant 
that increases with economy-wide inflation and is insensitive to the business 
cycle would not give states the fiscal flexibility necessary to cope with a reces-
sion. Over time, as well, the galloping pace of medical inflation would erode 
the value of the block grants, requiring states to ration access to medical care, 
either through cuts to benefits or to eligibility.97 Proposals to transform Medi-
caid into a block-grant program may trade on the rhetoric of states’ rights, but 
they have the perverse effect of inhibiting state power. 
Alternative approaches could mitigate the concern. Per capita grants an-
chored to a formula that accounted for the number of people within a state un-
der a particular income threshold, for example, would avoid the countercyclical 
trap: federal outlays would then increase as more people lost their jobs and be-
came dependent on government assistance. But because the data necessary to 
calculate funding levels may lag the economy by several years, a state could find 
itself in a financial pinch just as a recession takes hold.98 Nor would a per capita 
grant account for unanticipated cost spikes associated with the release of costly 
new therapies (like the new Hepatitis C drugs) or epidemics (like the Zika 
outbreak). Of greater concern, the size of per capita grants would have to in-
crease with medical inflation.99 Yet Republicans anticipate achieving large cost 
reductions through Medicaid reform—suggesting that the goal is not to pro-
vide sufficient funds to cover those who are currently eligible, but instead to 
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force states to shrink their programs through eligibility restrictions and benefit 
cuts.100 
conclusion 
The first health reform bill introduced in Congress a�er the 2016 election 
takes federalism seriously. Supported by a coterie of relatively moderate Re-
publican senators, the Patient Freedom Act of 2017—better-known as Cassidy-
Collins for its two principal sponsors—retains the ACA’s taxes and funding 
streams while giving states a new set of choices about how best to implement 
reform.101 States can reject the ACA outright, albeit at the cost of federal fund-
ing.102 They can adopt an alternative that channels federal money into health 
savings accounts.103 Or they can stick with the ACA, individual mandate and 
all.104 In other words, the federal government will pay for reform and the states 
have a menu of implementation options.105 
The prospects for Cassidy-Collins are dim. It lacks support from the Re-
publican leadership, which has so far thrown its weight behind the AHCA. But 
it offers a model that both parties would do well to examine closely. By giving 
states more room to chart their own path, the bill embraces the diversity that 
federalism celebrates. And it does so without cutting states off from the federal 
financial support that makes health reform possible. The end result will not be 
pretty: some states will make bad choices about how to reform their health-
care systems (although we may disagree about which states those are). But a 
law along these lines might enable partisans on both sides to move past the 
rancorous debate over the ACA.106 
At a minimum, both Republicans and Democrats should remain attentive 
to the justifications for vesting the federal government with power over health 
reform. Neither screeds about federal takeovers nor invectives about the heart-
lessness of the ACA’s opponents do justice to the complex interplay between 
state and federal authority. The states can’t act without the federal government: 
 
100. See Super, supra note 73, at 710-11. 
101. Patient Freedom Act of 2017, S. 191, 115th Cong. (2017). 
102. Id. at 102(a)(3). 
103. Id. at 102(a)(2). 
104. Id. at 102(a)(1). 
105. The bill also retains the ACA’s waiver provision, potentially enabling even more state exper-
imentation than is apparent on the face of the bill. Id. at 101(b)(5). 
106. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 955 
(2016) (arguing that “executive federalism” under the auspices of congressional statutes “fa-
cilitates a form of governance suited to polarization: state-differentiated national policy”). 
the yale law journal forum April 24, 2017 
26 
its financial support is the lifeblood of health reform. At the same time, the fed-
eral government has little cause to deprive states of the power to decide on the 
approach to reform that they think best. In a country marked by deep divi-
sions, there is much to be said for an Obamacare replacement that treads as lit-
tle on state authority as possible. 
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